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NOTES
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONAL RELEASE: A PYRRHIC
VICTORY FOR ARRESTEES' PRIVACY RIGHTS UNDER
UNITED STATES V. SCOTT
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Scott, the Ninth Circuit held that the common
criminal procedure practice of conditioning pretrial release on the
arrestee's consent to warrantless searches was an unconstitutional
violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreason-
able searches and seizures.1 Some observers quickly heralded the
decision as a "victory for the privacy rights of defendants awaiting
trial while on their own recognizance"2 and praised Judge Kozinski's
majority opinion as "extremely well-written and well-reasoned."3
The dissent cautioned, however, that the majority's conclusion "is
contrary to history, practice and commonsense; it carries monu-
mental implications for the pretrial procedures employed by every
state in our circuit, as well as the United States."4 The Harvard
Law Review echoed these concerns by noting that "while the
court's holding purported to protect privacy and liberty interests 'by
preventing governmental end-runs around the barriers to direct
commands,' its reasoning threatens that aim."5 The most obvious
1. 450 F.3d 863, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2006).
2. Pam Smith, 9th Circuit Curbs Warrantless Searches, RECORDER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 1.
3. Posting of Steven Kalar to Ninth Circuit Blog, http://circuit9.blogspot.com/2005/09/
case-o-week-off-scott-free-fourth.html (Sept. 12, 2005, 15:37 PST).
4. Scott, 450 F.3d at 875 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
5. Recent Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1637 (2006) (footnote omitted); see also Melanie
D. Wilson, The Price of Pretrial Release: Can We Afford To Keep Our Fourth Amendment
Rights?, 92 IOwA L. REV. 159, 197 (2007) ("ITihe Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v.
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implication of the Ninth Circuit's decision will be that arrestees in
Nevada will no longer be forced to make a Hobson's choice between
pretrial confinement on the one hand and pretrial release with the
condition of warrantless searches on the other. This seemingly
progressive decision may lead to the incongruous result that
arrestees' "Fourth Amendment rights will be secure while they rest
in the county jail" as courts will simply eliminate the conditional
release option for those charged with drug offenses.'
The facts of the case are typical of the modern pretrial approach
to drug arrests in both the federal and state levels.7 Raymond Scott
was arrested in Douglas County, Nevada, for possession of meth-
amphetamine and drug paraphernalia.8 He was released two days
later on his own recognizance (OR) after he consented to the
conditions of random drug testing and warrantless searches of his
home.9 Douglas Swalm, an officer of the Department of Alternative
Sentencing, received an anonymous tip that Scott had a handgun,
a sawed-off shotgun, and drug paraphernalia in violation of his
conditional release.10 Swalm, accompanied by other law enforcement
personnel, went to Scott's home to conduct a compliance visit." Scott
provided a urine sample that tested positive for methamphetamine,
use of which was a violation of his OR release. 2 The officers then
searched Scott's home for weapons and discovered a sawed-off
shotgun, another violation of his OR release. 13 Scott was subse-
quently charged with several firearm violations in district court, but
the judge granted Scott's motion to suppress all the evidence of
the violations, holding that the predicate search required probable
cause in order to be legitimate. 4 The government appealed the
decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and that court
upheld the district court's decision. 5
Scott was wrongly decided.").
6. Scott, 450 F.3d at 889 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. Scott, 450 F.3d at 875 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 875-76.
10. Id. at 876.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 875 (majority opinion).
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Part I of this Note provides the historical backdrop for the Scott
decision, including a brief outline of the emergence of the modern
pretrial system. Part II provides a comprehensive survey of the
few state and federal cases that have dealt with pretrial release
conditioned on consent to warrantless searches and random drug
testing. Part III closely examines the Ninth Circuit's rationale
in Scott and challenges Scott's legal underpinnings. Part III.A
examines the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the consent exception and
concludes that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. Part III.B briefly examines the special needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment and argues that the Ninth
Circuit mischaracterized the status of pretrial arrestees by claiming
that they are equivalent to free citizens and have identical privacy
expectations. This Note argues that the correct understanding
of pretrial arrestees' status is that they are in the "quasi-custody"
of the state. "Quasi-custody" most accurately reflects a pretrial
arrestee's diminished privacy expectation and would allow the state
to conduct limited warrantless searches based on reasonable
suspicion under the special needs exception." Finally, Part III.C
examines the totality of the circumstances test in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions and argues that under the new Court
guidance, the reasonableness balancing test tips in favor of the
government's ability to condition OR release on consent to warrant-
less searches.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of the American Pretrial System
In the American pretrial release system, pretrial detention and
bail 7 were historically the only two options afforded to criminal
defendants. 8 This traditional system was heavily criticized for being
16. See infra Part III.B.1.
17. The right to bail in all noncapital cases was established in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
See Scott C. Wells, Note, Criminal Procedure-United States v. Evans: District of Arrest or
District of Prosecution?-Determining the Proper Tribunal for Review of Pretrial Bail
Decisions in the Multi-district Context, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 487, 488 (1996).
18. See CHRIS W. ESKRIDGE, PRETRIAL RELEASE PROGRAMMING: IssuEs AND TRENDS 17
(1983).
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inherently inequitable and discriminatory. 9 The constitutional
safeguard against excessive bail, found in the Eighth Amendment, °
through time became a hollow right because courts often deliber-
ately set bail above defendants' means in order to detain them until
trial.2' In 1966, the Bail Reform Act overhauled the traditional
pretrial system.22 The 1966 Act, in response to mounting criticism
that the bail system was simply "de facto pretrial detention through
the imposition of insurmountable secured bond requirements," made
"own recognizance," or "OR," release the primary pretrial option for
all noncapital cases.2' The pertinent part of the 1966 Bail Reform
Act provided:
Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense
punishable by death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial
officer, be ordered released pending trial on his personal
recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance
bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the
officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a
release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person
as required.24
The Act was a progressive step forward, but it largely ignored the
perceived social epidemic of criminal activity by those released from
custody while awaiting trial.25
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 responded to the increasingly
"alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release" and
"the need to consider community safety in setting nonfinancial
pretrial conditions of release., 26 Both President Ronald Reagan and
Chief Justice Warren Burger urged Congress to amend the 1966
19. See JOHN S. GOLDKAMP ET AL., PERSONAL LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY SAFETY: PRETRIAL
RELEASE IN THE CRIMINAL COURT 3 (1995); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 18, at 23.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required .....
21. ESKRIDGE, supra note 18, at 20-21.
22. Pub. L. No. 89-465,80 Stat. 214 (1966) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3151
(1982) (repealed 1984)).
23. Michael Harwin, Detaining for Danger Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: Paradoxes
of Procedure and Proof, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 1091, 1093 (1993).
24. Bail Reforming Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465 § 3(a), 80 Stat. 214 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1982) (repealed 1984)).
25. See Harwin, supra note 23, at 1093.
26. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 3 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3185.
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Bail Reform Act to address the problem of crimes committed by
those on pretrial release.27 In § 3142(b) of the amended statute,
Congress explicitly embraced the notion that pretrial detention
could be based on judicial concern that the defendant's release could
jeopardize public safety. 28 Congress's decision to allow the defen-
dant's potential danger to the community to be a factor in release
decisions "mark[ed] a significant departure from the basic philoso-
phy" of the 1966 Bail Reform Act, which was solely designed "to
assure the appearance of the defendant at judicial proceedings. 29
Congress opted to give more discretion to judges to make more
appropriate pretrial release determinations by granting judges the
right to weigh the defendant's dangerousness to the community
against the defendant's liberty interests.3 ° The legality of denying
pretrial release based solely on the defendant's perceived danger-
ousness to the community was upheld by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Salerno.3
Another section of the 1984 Bail Reform Act, codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(c), allows courts to impose conditions on a defendant when
granting pretrial release, and it is Nevada's version of this
section that was at issue in Scott.3 2 Particularly, § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv)
provides for a "catch-all provision"33 that allows judges to impose
"any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the
appearance of the person as required and ... the safety of any other
person and the community. 34 Section 3142(c)(1)(B)(ix) allows
release to be conditioned on the defendant's consent to "refrain from
27. Id. at 5.
28. See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 203(a), 98 Stat. 1976 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (Supp. II 1984)).
29. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 3.
30. See id. at 5.
31. 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (holding that "the Government's regulatory interest in
community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty
interest").
32. See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 882 & nn.4-5 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J.,
dissenting).
33. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 16.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv) (2000). The court in Scott dealt explicitly with Nevada's
version of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv). NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.484(8) (West, Westlaw
through 2005 73d Reg. Sess.) (granting trial courts the ability to "impose such reasonable
conditions on the person as it deems necessary to protect the health, safety and welfare of the
community and to ensure that the person will appear at all times and places ordered by the
court"); see Scott, 450 U.S. at 882 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
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excessive use of alcohol, or any use of a narcotic drug or other
controlled substance. '3' The 1984 Bail Reform Act was drafted at a
time when the federal government had just begun to wage the so-
called war on drugs, so it is not surprising that illegal drugs are
twice mentioned as a factor for the court to consider in pretrial
36release decisions.
In response to the growing drug crisis, courts have increasingly
used the catch-all provision in § 3142(c)(1)(B)(ix), or the state law
equivalent, to demand that a defendant consent to random drug
tests and warrantless searches to ensure compliance with the
pretrial condition of refraining from drug use.37 Courts have viewed
this option as a viable solution to growing concerns about jail
overcrowding in general and the rise of drug-related arrests in
particular.38 The goal of this pretrial procedure mirrored the goal of
the 1984 Bail Reform Act in that it aimed to closely monitor those
charged with drug offenses to reduce the possibility of renewed
drug-related crime pending trial. 39 The program offered courts the
ability to avoid the harshness of pretrial detention while still
maintaining some level of control over the arrestee that would not
be possible in an unsupervised release situation. 0
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(ix) (2000).
36. See id. § 3142(g)(1)-(3)(A).
37. A Department of Justice report estimated that sixty-eight percent ofpretrial programs
report using drug testing as a tool in pretrial supervision. See John Clark & D. Alan Henry,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MONOGRAPH No. NCJ 199773, PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMMING AT
THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A SURVEY OF PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 39 (2003),
available at http://www.pretrial.org/pretrialsurvey.pdf.
38. See id. at 39, 45 (estimating that approximately forty-four percent of jails in
jurisdictions with pretrial programs are over capacity); see also Jennifer Latson, NN Jail's
Space Cris.s, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, Va.), Sept. 5, 2006, at Al (reporting that the
Newport News City Jail is designed to hold 248 inmates but is currently housing 693 inmates,
and that eighty-four percent of these inmates are awaiting trial). Overcrowding jails across
the country have been attributed to the federal "war on drugs." See id.
39. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MONOGRAPH NO. NCJ
176340 INTEGRATING DRUG TESTING INTO A PRETRIAL SERVICES SYSTEM: 1999 UPDATE xiii
(1999), available at http://ncjrs.gov/pdffiles l/bja/176340-l.pdf [hereinafter INTEGRATING DRUG
TESTING].
40. See id.
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B. Pretrial Services Systems
Jurisdictions began creating pretrial services systems in the
late 1960s to fill the "legislative 'gap"' that the 1966 Bail Reform
Act created by demanding that judicial officers make individualized
determinations when deciding whether to release a defendant.4 The
federal government first began experimenting with pretrial services
systems in 1974 by establishing ten demonstration agencies.42
Responding to the success of these demonstrations, Congress passed
the Federal Pretrial Services Act of 19824' to establish a federal
pretrial services agency.4 The mission of the U.S. Probation and
Pretrial Services System is "[t]o assist the federal courts in the fair
administration of justice[,] [tjo protect the community[, and] [t]o
bring about long-term positive change in individuals under supervi-
sion. ' 45 These pretrial services agencies began incorporating drug
testing, partly as a response to the 1984 Bail Reform Act, with a
pilot program in the District of Columbia sponsored by the National
Institute of Justice.4" The program tested defendants when arrested
solely to give the judicial officer a more objective basis for assessing
the defendant's risk at the bail hearing.47 If the defendant tested
positive for drugs, the court would order pretrial drug monitoring to
reduce the risk of pretrial misconduct.' The success of this testing
program spurred the Bureau of Justice Assistance to fund similar
programs in various counties.49 In 1995, President Bill Clinton
41. Peggy M. Tobolowsky & James F. Quinn, Drug-related Behavior as a Predictor of
Defendant Pretrial Misconduct, 25 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1019, 1024 (1994).
42. See Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076, 2086 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2000)); see also U.S. Courts, Beginnings of Probation and
Pretrial Services, http://www.uscourts.gov/fedprob/history/beginnings.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2007).
43. Pretrial Services Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-267, 96 Stat. 1139 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3155 (2000)).
44. See U.S. Courts, supra note 42; see also JOHN SCALIA, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ
168635, FEDERAL PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DETENTION, 1996, at 8 (1999), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fprd96.pdf.
45. See U.S. Courts, Mission, http://www.uscourts.gov/fedprob/mission.html (last visited
Mar. 12, 2007).
46. See INTEGRATING DRUG TESTING, supra note 39, at 1.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.; see also James K Stewart, Quid Pro Quo: Stay Drug-free and Stay on Release,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 73-74 (1988). See generally GOLDKAMP ET AL., supra note 19
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directed Attorney General Janet Reno to implement a drug testing
program for all federal arrestees in order to respond to the problem
of arrestees who are "hooked on drugs and still committing crimes
to support their habit" by reacting to the problem at "the earliest
possible stage in a person's interaction with the criminal justice
system-following arrest."'
The results of these efforts have led to a federal pretrial system
that combines drug screening with drug monitoring."1 These
separate and distinct programs work in unison to ensure that the
judicial officer has an objective way to, first, determine whether
the arrestee who is involved with drugs is an appropriate candidate
for pretrial release, and then, monitor that arrestee to ensure
compliance so as to "break the chain between drug use and criminal
activity for people who are under criminal supervision."52 As this
pretrial procedure gained prominence in both the federal and state
systems throughout the 1990s, arrestees initiated several legal
challenges to its constitutionality.53 Courts uniformly rejected these
challenges so long as the judge who set the pretrial conditions had
made an individualized determination of the arrestee's potential
danger to the community or risk of flight. 4 Against this historical
backdrop, the Ninth Circuit decided Scott.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRETRIAL SYSTEM UNDER
STATE AND FEDERAL PRECEDENT
Because the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the constitu-
tionality of warrantless searches and random drug testing for
pretrial arrestees and the issue has not been examined by any
federal court of appeals, 5 this Note briefly examines several lower
court decisions, which reveal a clear trend of courts upholding the
constitutionality of pretrial release conditions.
(analyzing pretrial drug testing in Boston, Dade County, and Maricopa County).
50. See INTEGRATING DRUG TESTING, supra note 39, at 1-2 (quoting President Bill Clinton).
51. See id. at 2.
52. See Remarks on Ending Drug Use and Drug Availability for Offenders and Exchange
with Reporters, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 47, 48 (Jan. 12, 1998).
53. See infra Part II.
54. See infra Part II.
55. See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 864 (9th Cir. 2006).
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A. Initial Federal Response
One of the earliest challenges to the practice of mandatory
urinalysis as a condition of pretrial release in federal court was
found in the 1987 case of Berry v. District of Columbia.56 Berry
claimed that mandatory urinalyses as a condition of release violated
his Fourth Amendment rights because it amounted to an unreason-
able search and seizure.5" The district court held that a mandatory
urinalysis did not raise issues of a "constitutional dimension,"" but
the D.C. Circuit reversed, stating that "[m]andatory urinalysis
clearly implicates rights secured under the Fourth Amendment."59
The testing could not be found constitutionally reasonable absent
proof of a "positive correlation between drug use and pretrial
criminality or non-appearance."'  Remanding the case, the D.C.
Circuit provided guidance by stating that a testing program would
"more likely than not be found reasonable" if there was an "individ-
ualized determination that an arrestee will use drugs while released
pending trial."'" The court also cautioned that the district court
"must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in
which it is conducted ... and the place in which it is conducted."62
Finally, the testing must not be "more degrading than is reasonably
necessary."63 Although the D.C. Circuit did not itself decide whether
56. 833 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Plaintiff Tyrone Berry was arrested several times in
1984 for drug charges. See id. at 1032. He was released on his own recognizance on the
condition that he submit to urinalysis drug tests. Id. Berry failed to submit to the drug testing
and was later arrested on separate drug charges. Id. The court then released him into third-
party custody with the same urinalysis condition. Id. Berry tested positive for illegal drugs
once, then failed to report for later scheduled tests. Id. The court ultimately set a $2000
surety bond that Berry was unable to pay, so he was jailed. Id. at 1032-33.
57. Id. at 1033.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1034. The Supreme Court ultimately confirmed the D.C. Circuit's view that
mandatory urinalyses implicates the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989) (holding that although urinalysis does not
entail an intrusion into the body, it is nevertheless a search under the Fourth Amendment
because it "can reveal a host of private medical facts" and therefore is an intrusion upon a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy).
60. Berry, 833 F.2d at 1035.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1036 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
63. Id. (quoting Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
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mandatory urinalysis was constitutional,64 the court clearly signaled
that a pretrial testing program could be constitutional as long as the
government followed certain procedural safeguards.
B. States' Interpretations
Only California, Indiana, Maine, and the District of Columbia
have ruled on the constitutionality of random drug testing and
warrantless searches for pretrial arrestees. The leading decision
was the 1995 California Supreme Court case In re York.65 The court
in York held that "neither the statutory nor the constitutional
provisions upon which [the arrestees] rely prohibit a court, in
appropriate circumstances, from conditioning OR release upon a
defendant's agreement to comply with these challenged terms."66
Echoing the holding in Berry, the court held that although a judge
may constitutionally condition an arrestee's pretrial release on
consent to warrantless searches and random drug testing, the judge
must first make an "individualized determination as to the reason-
ableness of the conditions imposed ... based upon the circumstances
presented in each [arrestee's] case."67
The court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment proscribes "only
unreasonable searches and seizures" and that it is not unreasonable
to require those who are granted the privilege of pretrial release to
live with conditions similar to those imposed on arrestees in pretrial
confinement.6" The court rejected the notion that an arrestee has the
same privacy expectations as someone who has not been charged
with a crime because a defendant "has no constitutional right to be
free from confinement prior to trial."69 Those on OR release have a
"diminished liberty interest" and are more similar to probationers
than to someone who has not been charged with any crime.7°
The York court noted that while the condition imposed did not
relate directly to the likelihood of court appearance, it did "clearly
64. The D.C. Circuit found that the record before it contained insufficient evidence for it
to make this determination. Id. at 1035.
65. In re York, 892 P.2d 804 (Cal. 1995).
66. Id. at 805.
67. Id. at 806.
68. See id. at 813.
69. Id.
70. See id.
2374 [Vol. 48:2365
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relate to the prevention and detection of further crime and thus to
the safety of the public."'" This view harkens back to the change in
the federal bail system that occurred when the 1984 Bail Reform Act
explicitly embraced the notion that public safety ought to be a factor
considered in setting conditions for pretrial release.72 Also embrac-
ing this notion, the York court went on to find a clear nexus between
the condition of warrantless searches and random drug tests and
the state's legitimate interest in ensuring public safety.
In a later case, Oliver v. United States, the District of Columbia's
court of last resort followed the analysis in York when concluding
that mandatory pretrial drug testing is constitutional.73 That court,
the D.C. Court of Appeals, held that the trial court had "discretion-
ary authority ... to condition Oliver's release on his submission to
drug testing.7 v4 The court noted that if a court has the power to
insist that the defendant abstain from illegal drug use, "it must
necessarily have the authority to test compliance with that order
through drug testing."75 The court found that the government's
interest was "compelling" while the intrusion on individual liberty
was only "minimal."76
In finding the nexus between random drug testing and the
state's compelling interest in crime prevention, which was essential
to the program's legality, the Oliver court relied on "numerous
empirical studies" linking drug use to the probability of recidivism.77
Furthermore, the court was satisfied that urinalysis was the
'least restrictive" means that could be employed because it was
'less intrusive than blood tests, and less restrictive than constant
supervision and incarceration."7
The constitutionality of random drug screens as a condition of bail
was again upheld by an Indiana court in the 2002 case Steiner v.
71. Id. at 810.
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2000). This provision was upheld in United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 746-52 (1987). State legislatures, including California's, have adopted the 1984
Bail Reform Act's idea that decisions about bail and OR release should be based not only on
ensuring appearance at trial but also on public safety. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1270,
1271(c), 1272(b), 1275 (West 2004).
73. See 682 A.2d 186, 193 (D.C. 1996).
74. Id. at 189.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 190.
77. Id. at 191-92.
78. Id. at 192.
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State."s As in Berry, the court did not rule on the constitutional
question, but did indicate that an individualized determination
would be required for any drug testing program to be reasonable. 0
A final case, from the Supreme Court of Maine, upheld war-
rantless searches and random drug testing of pretrial arrestees
based on both the persuasive precedent of York and on a reason no
other court had addressed, the special needs exception. In State v.
Ullring,1 the court held:
There are situations in which the history and personal situation
of the defendant, including the charges against him or her,
justify a determination by a judicial officer that a random search
condition is both necessary and the least restrictive alternative
that will ensure the defendant's appearance and the integrity of
the judicial process."2
The court stressed that the defendant consented to the search,
thus placing the burden on the defendant to prove that the condition
was unreasonable.8 3 The court claimed that while warrantless
searches are usually unconstitutional, they can be constitutional if
"special needs" made probable cause and warrants "impractical." 4
As in York, the Uliring court explicitly likened pretrial arrestees to
probationers; it went on to hold that the needs and purposes of both
the bail and probation systems presented "special needs" that
justified warrantless searches."8
The overwhelming weight of state and federal precedent points
to the constitutionality of random pretrial drug testing and
warrantless searches of pretrial arrestees' homes for drugs as long
as those conditions are based on an individual determination of the
arrestee's likelihood of continued drug use while awaiting trial.
Despite the bulk of persuasive precedent, the majority in Scott
79. 763 N.E.2d 1024, 1027-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
80. Id. at 1028.
81. 741 A.2d 1065 (Me. 1999).
82. Id. at 1073.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1072 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (holding that
warrantless searches of probationer's home were valid because the special needs of probation
enforcement made the warrant requirement impracticable)).
85. Id.
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deemed the warrantless search unreasonable and thus a violation
of Scott's Fourth Amendment rights.
III. THE MAJORITY'S RATIONALE IN SCOTT CRITIQUED
The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
frequently attacked by scholars as inconsistent, result-oriented, and
confused.86 The Supreme Court initially held that the text of the
Fourth Amendment required a warrant based on probable cause
for all governmental searches and seizures "subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."87 The Court
has since generally shed the warrant requirement and replaced it
with the far more ambiguous "reasonableness" standard that allows
the state much more flexibility.' The well-delineated exceptions to
the warrant requirement have become so numerous that they have
swallowed the rule. 9 The majority in Scott, however, perceived some
vitality remaining in the rule when it examined and rejected three
potential exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant require-
ments: consent, special needs, and totality of the circumstances. 90
86. See, e.g., Tracey Macin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave
Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 897 (2002) ("Mhe Court's use
of history in Fourth Amendment cases has been unpredictable and inconsistent."); Kathryn
R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme Court's Multiple
Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1390 (2003) (noting that "sometimes the Court
has stated that reasonableness requires case-by-case analysis, but at other times it has
required bright-line rules" and that examination of the Court's "different rhetorical framings
reveals the tremendous breadth that the Court has in constructing Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, an evolving standard).
87. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
88. See Urbonya, supra note 86, at 1391 ("[Ihe Court created so many exceptions to the
warrant requirement that the 'requirement' became only a 'general rule."). The Supreme
Court has become fond of saying that the "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness." See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2201 n.4 (2006); United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09
(1977) (stating that the "touchstone" of Fourth Amendment analysis is "the reasonableness
in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal
security" (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968))); Note, The Fourth Amendment and
Antidilution: Confronting the Overlooked Function of the Consent Search Doctrine, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2187, 2204 (2006) (stating that "the Court has become increasingly willing to
undertake a free-floating 'reasonableness' inquiry that considers the 'totality of the
circumstances"').
89. See supra note 88.
90. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2006).
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A careful analysis of the Ninth Circuit's rationale reveals that the
majority made several radical departures from traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis.9 First, the majority misused the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions when it dismissed the argument that
Scott waived his Fourth Amendment rights by consenting to the bail
conditions.92 Second, the majority explicitly redefined the status of
a pretrial arrestee in order to recognize greater privacy expectations
than an arrestee truly has.93 Finally, the court incorrectly required
too onerous a burden to show that special needs existed, demanding
empirical proof despite conceding that congressional findings had
been made.94 These legal conclusions deserve close scrutiny because
together they work to tip the totality of the circumstances balancing
test in favor of the pretrial arrestee and clear the path for the
holding that probable cause must exist anytime the government
wishes to search the home of a pretrial arrestee.
A. Consent and Unconstitutional Conditions
Perhaps the most compelling argument that the condition of
warrantless searches and random drug tests should be permissible
is that the defendant consented to these restrictions when he
waived his Fourth Amendment rights. A person can consent to give
up constitutional rights, including the Fourth Amendment right
against searches and seizures, so long as the consent is truly
voluntary.95 To be voluntary, consent must not be "coerced, by
explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force."96 The
issue of consent looms large in Scott because if it is determined that
91. For an excellent discussion challenging the Ninth Circuit's rationale in Scott, see
generally Wilson, supra note 5, which was published during the editing of this Note.
92. Scott, 450 F.3d at 866-68.
93. See id. at 873-74 (distinguishing a pretrial arrestee from a probationer, whose
reasonable expectations of privacy are lower).
94. See id. at 870-72.
95. See DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND PRIVACY 10 (1994); see also Kaupp
v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 631 (2003) (holding that police who woke a teenager from his own bed
at 3:00 a.m., stating only that they needed "to go and talk" did not gain voluntary consent and
that his compliance was "mere submission to a claim of lawful authority"); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (holding that determinations of the voluntariness of a
search must be based on "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances"); Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946) (holding that Fourth Amendment rights "may be waived").
96. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228.
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Scott voluntarily waived his constitutional right against warrantless
searches by accepting the government's offer of OR release, then
Fourth Amendment concerns largely become moot.9 7
1. Consent and the Imprecise Doctrine of Unconstitutional
Conditions
The Scott majority attempted to defuse the consent issue by
invoking the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.9" This doctrine
stands for the proposition that "even if a state has absolute
discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the
privilege subject to conditions that improperly 'coerce,' 'pressure,' or
'induce' the waiver of constitutional rights."9 9 In other words, the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions "declares that whatever an
express constitutional provision forbids government to do directly
it equally forbids government to do indirectly."" On its face, the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions seems ready-made for the
criminal procedure practice at issue in Scott. The government
was, at the very least, inducing Scott to give up his constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures in exchange for
the discretionary benefit of OR release. Such a governmental
offer appears to place the defendant "between the rock and the
whirlpool"'' 1 of having to choose between the evils of pretrial
detainment on the one hand and pretrial release absent constitu-
tional safeguards on the other.
97. See Scott, 450 F.3d at 887 (Bybee, J., dissenting); see also Matthew S. Roberson, Note,
"Don't Bother Knockin'.. Come on In:" The Constitutionality of Warrantless Searches as a
Condition of Probation, 25 CAMPBELL L. REV. 181, 192 (2003) ("Consent effectively removes
the issue of reasonableness from Fourth Amendment discussions.").
98. See Scott, 450 F.3d at 866-68.
99. Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword.- Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6-7 (1988); see also
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1421-22 (1989)
(defining the doctrine as a problem that arises when "government offers a benefit on condition
that the recipient perform or forego an activity that a preferred constitutional right normally
protects from government interference).
100. William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1445-46 (1968).
101. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926).
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The majority in Scott relied on only one case, Dolan v. City of
Tigard,102 and two academic articles 10 3 to support its use of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 14 As a preliminary matter,
the majority's reliance on these three sources raises an eyebrow.
Both academic articles, though certainly highly esteemed, were
written almost two decades ago and thus do not take into account
the doctrine's subsequent evolution. The court's reliance on Dolan
is also problematic because Dolan involved property rights and
regulatory takings0 5 and is easily distinguishable from the criminal
procedure issue in Scott.
Beyond these preliminary concerns, the majority's decision to use
the doctrine requires a closer analysis. Many have criticized the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 1 6 Perhaps the most famous
opponent of the doctrine was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
who declared, "[i]f the State may prohibit, it may prohibit with the
privilege of avoiding the prohibition in a certain way."1 °7 He most
famously said that though a policeman has a constitutional right "to
talk politics ... he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."108
In other words, the State's "greater power to exclude might be said
to include the lesser power to admit on condition."'1 9
Justice Sutherland, Holmes's contemporary on the bench, was an
early champion of the doctrine. Sutherland believed, "[i]f the state
may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition
of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is
inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the United States
102. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
103. The court relied on articles by Richard Epstein and Kathleen M. Sullivan. See Epstein,
supra note 99; Sullivan, supra note 99.
104. See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2006).
105. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377.
106. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 99, at 1416 (noting that the doctrine is "riven with
inconsistencies"); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 337, 338 (1989) (arguing that the doctrine is "far too crude and general a way
to address the multiple possible collisions between constitutional protections and the modern
regulatory state"); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an
Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV.
593, 620 (1990) (reasserting the claim that the doctrine is "too crude and too general to
provide help in dealing with contested cases").
107. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
108. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
109. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 7 (1993).
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Constitution may thus be manipulated out of existence.""' Ulti-
mately, Sutherland's views seem to have prevailed and the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions thrived during the Lochner Era as a
tool to invalidate laws that stifled corporations' freedoms."' Under
the Warren Court, the doctrine took on renewed popularity as a way
of protecting individual liberties, especially First Amendment
Rights." 2 The Rehnquist Court also applied the doctrine, most
notably to the Takings Clause, to protect property rights."13 Today,
the doctrine remains viable but frustratingly elusive because there
is no clearly defined unifying theory that explains why "conditional
offers are sometimes constitutionally permissible and sometimes
not.""' 4 The theory continues to "roam a about constitutional law like
Banquo's ghost, invoked in some cases, but not in others." ' Despite
the best efforts of scholars, the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions continues to be controversial and elusive." ' This frustration
was best summarized by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Dolan:
"Although it has a long history, the 'unconstitutional conditions'
doctrine has for just as long suffered from notoriously inconsistent
application; it has never been an overarching principle of constitu-
tional law that operates with equal force regardless of the nature of
the rights and powers in question.""'
2. The Tension Between Unconstitutional Conditions and
Criminal Waiver
These inconsistencies raise an important preliminary question:
is criminal procedure an appropriate area of the law in which to
apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine? The majority in
Scott thought it was, stating, "[t]he doctrine [of unconstitutional
110. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926).
111. See Sullivan, supra note 99, at 1416.
112. Id.
113. Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigar& Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72
DENV. U. L. REV. 859,887-88 (1995).
114. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2001).
115. Epstein, supra note 99, at 10-11.
116. See Berman, supra note 114, at 3.
117. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 407 n.12 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
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conditions] is especially important in the Fourth Amendment
context." ' Similarly, in an early article, Howard E. Abrams wrote
that the Supreme Court "by intellectual abstinence, declined to
extend the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to criminal
procedure, its most natural setting.""' 9 Abrams argued that rights
to a "trial by jury, to confront one's accusers, and to refuse to testify
against oneself' were "enshrined as the supreme law of the land ...
because they were thought to be so important that they should not
be denied even if a legislature thinks there is a good reason for
doing so.' 12°
On the other hand, Judge Callahan's dissent in Scott claimed that
"no court has ever suggested that Fourth Amendment rights cannot
be temporarily limited by agreement, at least not when the agree-
ment is rationally related to changes in the individual's legal
status." 1 ' Indeed, the Supreme Court appears to agree. It has
rejected the concerns of critics like Abrams and has refused to
extend the doctrine to criminal procedure.'22 The Court has
explicitly said that, "[a] criminal defendant may knowingly and
voluntarily waive many of the most fundamental protections
afforded by the Constitution."'23 For example, the right to a jury
trial is "waived all the time through plea bargaining, without a
118. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2006).
119. Howard E. Abrams, Systemic Coercion: Unconstitutional Conditions in the Criminal
Law, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 128, 128 (1981) (footnote omitted).
120. Id. at 150-51.
121. Scott, 450 F.3d at 896 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
122. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (holding that Fifth Amendment
defense of double jeopardy is waivable); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (holding
that a guilty plea waives Fifth Amendment right to confront one's accusers and Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (holding that
a defendant may waive Sixth Amendment right to counsel). But see United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 118 n.4 (2001). In Knights, the Court mentioned that the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions could be a potential limit to one's consent, but then made no
further comment on the possibility. See id. By not rejecting the doctrine outright, the Knights
Court implicitly suggested that the Court could be willing to extend the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions to the criminal procedure setting, given the right facts. See
Wilson, supra note 5, at 207 ("[W]hile the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been
sparingly applied to invalidate a criminal defendant's 'choice' between two competing
constitutional rights, the Supreme Court appears to have accepted the doctrine and certainly
has never expressly rejected its application.").
123. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995); see also Peretz v. United
States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (holding that the "most basic rights of criminal defendants
are ... subject to waiver").
[Vol. 48:23652382
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONAL RELEASE
second thought being given to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine., 124 Defendants waive these constitutional rights in order
to gain some discretionary benefit, such as a more favorable plea
bargain or the dropping of charges, yet the Court has refused to
apply the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to these types
of bargains and has instead embraced the doctrine of criminal
waiver.'25 The doctrines of unconstitutional conditions and criminal
waiver address exactly the same issue, yet the underlying presump-
tions could not be more different. 12 Criminal waiver presumes that
the individual is in the best position to decide whether to barter
away a constitutional right for a governmental benefit, while
unconstitutional conditions paternalistically presumes that the
government always has an unfair advantage that makes any deal
coercive.' 27 "[C]riminal waiver turns the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions on its head.' 28
In light of the important place of criminal waiver, the Scott
majority's reliance on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine for a
criminal procedure issue seems misplaced. But the elusive nature
of the doctrine, 129 and the Supreme Court's perhaps confused Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, 30 leave open the possibility that the
Court might one day apply the doctrine in a modern criminal case,
perhaps even one similar to Scott. With that caveat in mind, it is
necessary to consider how the modern version of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions would properly be applied to the facts
124. Merrill, supra note 113, at 875; see Marcy Jena King, Priceless Process-nonnegotiable
Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REv., 113, 114-15 ("Almost every feature of the
criminal litigation process, including rights and requirements previously considered
inalienable, have become bargaining chips.").
125. See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 801, 832 (2003) (noting
that although the "Court routinely invalidates deals involving First Amendment rights, it
takes exactly the opposite approach in the criminal context, where individuals are free to use
their constitutional rights as bargaining chips"); see also Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding
Waiver, 40 Hous. L. REv. 281, 336 (2003) (stating that most waivers occur in the criminal
setting and that the language of the Fourth Amendment is perfectly "compatible" with
voluntary waiver).
126. See Mazzone, supra note 125, at 802.
127. See id. at 832.
128. Id.
129. See supra Part III.A.1.
130. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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of Scott. A useful starting point for this analysis is the Court's most
recent interpretation of the doctrine in Dolan.
3. Applying the Dolan Test
In Dolan, the city of New Tigard approved Dolan's building
permit only on the condition that Dolan consent to dedicating a
portion of her land for a flood plain and as a pedestrian pathway."13
The Court invalidated the proposed exaction by relying on the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, 132 stating that, "[u]nder the
well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' the government
may not require a person to give up a constitutional right ... in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government
where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the
property.'33 The emphasized portion of the Court's definition of
unconstitutional conditions represents a modification of the
traditional definition of the doctrine. The Court now required an
"essential nexus" between the benefit and the right, 3 and also
demanded that there be a "rough proportionality" between the
benefit and the right.'35 Although in Dolan, the "essential nexus"
and "rough proportionality" tests worked to invalidate a condition,
they in fact severely limited the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, because the Court was now "more concerned with the
nature and value of the right, and the government's rationale for
requiring the citizen to give it up, than it [was] with problems of
consent.' ' 136 By focusing more on the nature of the right than on the
power imbalance or level of coercion, the Court implicitly rejected
Epstein's theory that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is
aimed at leveling the playing field when an individual seeks to
strike a bargain with the government's monopoly.'37
Dolan's nexus requirement thus undercut the Scott majority's
reasoning that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was
131. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379-80 (1994).
132. See id. at 396.
133. Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 386 (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)).
135. Id. at 391.
136. Merrill, supra note 113, at 861.
137. See id. at 860-64; see also Epstein, supra note 99, at 16-25.
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meant to ensure voluntary consent when dealing with the govern-
ment."8 Indeed, even prior to the Dolan decision, Professor Sullivan
noted that "focusing on coercion alone misses the point;" in an
unconstitutional condition question, the "germaneness" of the
condition is perhaps the more important factor.3 9 The majority in
Scott relied on Sullivan's article and yet, significantly, failed to
analyze the "germaneness" factor when concluding that there was
an unconstitutional condition. This "germaneness" factor means
simply that, after Dolan, the real question is not whether the
individual consented, but rather whether there was an essential
link between the right infringed and the benefit sought.
Aside from the importance of this link, expressed in the nexus
and proportionality requirements, there seems to be another
element at play in the application of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, and perhaps even in the threshold question of whether the
doctrine will be applied at all. That element is the distinction
between constitutional rights that are simply private entitlements
and those that are public goods.'4 ° The notion that some constitu-
tional rights are like public goods is essential to understanding the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, according to professor Merrill,
who suggests that the doctrine must be examined as a "Public Goods
Model" that focuses on the "effects on third parties."'' This theory
helps "explain why some constitutional rights are protected by a
more robust version of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine than
are other rights."'42 The explanation, according to Merrill, lies in
the level of public benefit associated with various rights. 4 ' This
might be what Professor Sullivan meant when she stated that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine protects "[pireferred constitu-
tional liberties.' 44
Under this understanding of the doctrine, it may be useful to
determine the level of public benefit associated with the Fourth
138. See Merrill, supra note 113, at 864 (stating that "the Dolan decision must be counted
against the proposition that government coercion is the key to understanding the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine").
139. Sullivan, supra note 99, at 1456-57.
140. Merrill, supra note 113, at 862.
141. Id. at 870.
142. Id. at 874.
143. Id.
144. Sullivan, supra note 99, at 1490 (emphasis added).
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Amendment. Clearly, the individual asked to waive the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures values it highly, but
there are few public benefits. 145 The "collective impact" of waiver of
the Fourth Amendment is minimal because the "waiver by one
defendant is seldom binding on another."'46 This interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment helps to explain why some commentators
have called the Fourth Amendment "a kind of second-class protec-
tion" that is not as highly regarded as other constitutional rights.
147
It is the lack of collective impact and public good that helps explain
why courts allow criminal defendants to freely barter away their
individual Fourth Amendment rights.'48
Of course, the Court could determine that the Fourth Amendment
deserves special protection and that there are very real public goods
concerns at issue. 149 Yet, even if the Court did apply the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine in its most robust form, it would probably
still uphold a condition like the one in Scott because there is
arguably a link between the benefit and the right that would satisfy
the nexus requirement. In attaching the condition to release, the
government is endeavoring to ensure that the benefit of OR release
is not abused and that the conditions of release are met-a purpose
indicative of a satisfactory nexus. In this case, the least restrictive
way of ensuring compliance is to have random drug tests and
145. Merrill, supra note 113, at 875.
146. Id. at 879; see also Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1526 (2006) (holding that "a
warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by
a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of
consent given to the police by another resident).
147. ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS 113 (2003); see also Tracey
Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARYL. REV. 197,230,233
(1993) (arguing that although the "Fourth Amendment ranks as a fundamental right
deserving strict judicial protection," the evidence of the Supreme Court's "disinterest in
Fourth Amendment freedoms is abundant").
148. Merrill, supra note 113, at 879.
149. See id. at 888. Perhaps the Court would consider the public good of ensuring privacy
rights for as many citizens as possible to avoid any slippery slope into a police state. See
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (stating that "if the Government were
suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to
warrantless entry ... those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in
ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protections was"). Although it may be easy
to deride Fourth Amendment protections as tools of defense attorneys to free "dangerous
felons," it is fundamental that "the Constitution does not tolerate the tactics of a police state."
Macin, supra note 147, at 197-98.
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warrantless searches of the arrestee's home for drugs. Otherwise, it
would be far too easy for the defendant to violate the conditions of
release with impunity. These conditions, as one state court noted,
are "both necessary and the least restrictive alternative that will
ensure the defendant's appearance and the integrity of the judicial
process." 50
This argument that the pretrial release program did not impose
an unconstitutional condition ironically finds support in the two
hypothetical situations that the Scott majority employed to bolster
its conclusion that the government did violate the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. The court argued: "The right to keep
someone in jail does not in any way imply the right to release that
person subject to unconstitutional conditions-such as chopping off
a finger or giving up one's first-born."'15 These two rather extreme
examples highlight the uncontroversial fact that not all pretrial
conditions would meet the Dolan "nexus" and "rough proportional-
ity" tests. Certainly, the chopping off of a finger would fail the nexus
test because the deprivation of the right to bodily integrity bears no
relationship to the benefit of pretrial release. Furthermore, while
treating the child as collateral bail may meet the nexus test
because the deprivation would help ensure the defendant's court
attendance, it would miserably fail the rough proportionality test.
These examples of unconstitutional conditions only throw into stark
relief the more closely related and more proportional condition of
pretrial drug testing. The Scott court was right to emphasize that in
order for a condition to be constitutional, there must be an individu-
alized determination that narrowly tailors the pretrial condition to
the defendant, but the court's expansive holding was not necessary
to uphold this requirement, which had already been demanded by
every court that had ruled on pretrial conditional release.'52
B. Special Needs
A growing exception to the Fourth Amendment's probable cause
requirement is the "special needs" doctrine. This doctrine holds that
150. State v. Ulring, 741 A.2d 1065, 1073 (Me. 1999).
151. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 866 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006).
152. See supra Part II.
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if special needs exist "beyond the normal need for law enforcement"
that make the probable cause requirement "impracticable," then
searches based on something less than probable cause are
allowable." 3 In other words, the Court has determined that, "where
the 'Government seeks to prevent the development of hazardous
conditions,"' the probable cause standard "may be unsuited to
determining the reasonableness of administrative searches.' ' 4 The
special needs exception has been used to permit suspicionless drug
testing for certain narrow classes of individuals, such as high school
students, 155 railway workers," and customs employees." 7 The
Supreme Court in Griffin v. Wiscon8in determined that the need
to verify whether a probationer was complying with the terms of
probation also represented a "special need" that justified warrant-
less searches of the probationer's home by the probation officer
without probable cause.' The Court stressed that Griffin's status
as a probationer was crucial in the special needs analysis because
probationers and parolees "do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, but only ... conditional liberty
properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restric-
tions."" 9 The status of pretrial arrestees thus must be fully fleshed
out in order to determine whether a special needs exception would
be appropriate in Scott.
1. The Legal Status of Pretrial Arrestees
The state courts consistently equated a pretrial arrestee's status
to that of a probationer and thus relied on the well established
line of Supreme Court cases dealing with probationer's rights as
153. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the jutdgment)).
154. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Seh. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) (quoting
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667-68 (1989)).
155. See id. at 828-29.
156. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
157. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 673-75.
158. See 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) ("A State's operation of a probation system, like its
operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry,
likewise presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures
from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.").
159. Id. at 874 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
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dispositive.'6 0 The Ninth Circuit rejected this comparison and
treated an arrestee's rights as the same as those of a normal citizen
because arrestees "are ordinary people who have been accused of a
crime but are presumed innocent."'' The majority insisted that
"[p]robationers are different" and that a pretrial arrestee's "privacy
and liberty interests were far greater than a probationer's." ' 2 The
dissent, on the other hand, believed that arrestees "may be treated
differently than ordinary citizens without violating the presumption
of innocence."'63 The dissent acknowledged that there are important
differences between a pretrial arrestee and a probationer but
claimed that the "distinction is not constitutionally relevant" in
determining whether one's Fourth Amendment rights have been
violated." The dissent never explicitly categorized pretrial ar-
restees' status, opting instead to claim that arrestees' privacy
expectations are "somewhat greater than that of a probationer,
parolee, or presentence releasee, but it is less than that of an
'ordinary citizen."'165
Neither the majority's position nor the dissent's is intellectually
satisfying. The status of pretrial arrestees has long represented a
point of contention as courts have wrangled for a definition that
truly encapsulates pretrial arrestees' unique position in the criminal
justice system. The lack of a clear definition of a pretrial arrestee's
status is a lacuna in criminal law that must be filled. A clear
definition of a pretrial arrestee's status would make either a "special
needs" or a "totality of the circumstances" analysis more consistent
and fair.
The controversy over pretrial arrestees' status first developed in
the context of pretrial detainees, that is, those not released on bail
or their own recognizance." Pretrial detainees are considered "a
special category of inmates" who retain the "same rights as other
citizens except to the extent necessary to assure their appearance
160. See supra Part II.B.
161. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2006).
162. Id. at 873-74.
163. Id. at 883 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 885.
166. See JOHN W. PALMER & STEPHEN E. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
39-40 (7th ed. 2004).
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at trial and the security of the institution."'67 Pretrial detainees'
hybrid status has created a patchwork of constitutionally permissi-
ble restrictions on their rights as long as the restrictions are not
aimed to punish. 6 ' Courts have thus held that strip searches of
pretrial detainees must be "based upon reasonable suspicion that
[the] particular detainee is concealing weapons or contraband."'69
Some courts have held that pretrial detainees do not have a
constitutional right to receive a minimum number of visitors per
week or to have the visits last a minimum length of time because
the prison created these restrictions for security reasons, not to
punish.170
The fact that a pretrial detainee can be lawfully confined and
thus have many rights restricted in the name of institutional
security does not squarely answer the question of what the rights
are of a pretrial arrestee who is not detained. The dissent in Scott
suggested that the pretrial arrestee ought to have the same
diminished expectation of privacy that a pretrial detainee has
because pretrial arrestees "are separated from confinement only
by a few hundred dollars or a signature on a consent form."''
Essentially, this view holds that a pretrial arrestee who is released
pending trial has the same diminished privacy expectations as a
pretrial arrestee who is confined and therefore that all the adminis-
trative (and warrantless) searches and seizures that are allowed to
ensure the good order and discipline of a prison can be lawfully
167. Id.; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979) (holding that "preserving
internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of
retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees" and that
"[p]rison officials must be free to take appropriate action").
168. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 537-38; PALMER & PALMER, supra note 166, at 40; see also
Occhino v. United States, 686 F.2d 1302, 1306 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that "shackling and
searches to which appellant was subject were not in disproportion to the legitimate objectives
of pretrial detention").
169. PALMER & PALMER, supra note 166, at 40.
170. See Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 1980) (upholding the prison's blanket
policy against visitors since the restriction was not meant to be a punishment); Inmates of
Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 758 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process is not denied when contact visits for county jail inmates was
prohibited due to security concerns rather than as a method of punishment); Cooper v. Morin,
424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 170-71 (N.Y. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980) (holding that detainees
are "entitled to contact visits of reasonable duration" based on the New York Constitution, but
not based on the United States Constitution).
171. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 886 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting).
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applied to all pretrial arrestees. This argument suffers from one
glaring flaw-the only reason the Supreme Court has upheld
warrantless searches for those in pretrial confinement is to ensure
the administrative security of the prison system, not as a form of
punishment.'72 This reasoning suggests, that because the govern-
ment does not have administrative security concerns when it
releases a pretrial arrestee, the pretrial arrestee should not have to
suffer from any of the same deprivations. Just because "individuals
confined in prison pending trial have no greater privacy rights than
other prisoners"7 ' does not mean that arrestees who are not
imprisoned have the same privacy rights as prisoners. As the
majority notes, searches "justified by institutional needs such as
prison security and escape prevention" are "inapplicable when a
defendant is awaiting trial outside of a detention facility."'
174
Despite this flaw in the dissent's argument, there is something
intuitively correct in the dissent's assertion that "individuals
charged with a crime and released before trial are not like ordinary
citizens."'7 s As Justice Scalia noted, "[t]he fact of prior lawful arrest
distinguishes the arrestee from society at large. '176 The majority's
rationale that a pretrial arrestee must be treated as an ordinary
citizen because of the presumption of innocence is thoroughly
unconvincing 17 because the Supreme Court has explicitly held that
the presumption of innocence is simply a trial right that has "no
application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee
during confinement before his trial has even begun.'' 7 This view of
the presumption of innocence is necessary for practical reasons;
otherwise, a pretrial defendant would never be allowed to be
confined prior to a guilty verdict regardless of the severity of the
crime charged.
A different perspective from the more extreme positions of the
majority and dissent strikes the proper legal balance: the Supreme
Court should explicitly hold that all pretrial arrestees, whether
172. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
173. Scott, 450 F.3d at 878 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 873 n.14 (majority opinion).
175. Id. at 886 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
176. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 630 (Scalia, J., concurring).
177. See Scott, 450 F.3d at 874.
178. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
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released or confined, are in the "quasi-custody" of the government.
This view reflects the reality of pretrial arrestees because once
arrested, arrestees no longer enjoy the same rights as ordinary
citizens.'79 The dissent noted that "a defendant released on his own
recognizance, even though he has not been charged with a crime, is
considered to be 'in custody' for some purposes."'8 ° The dissent
suggested the quasi-custodial status of pretrial arrestees when it
wrote, "[i]mportantly, the common law seems to have regarded the
difference between pretrial incarceration, bail, and other ways to
secure a defendant's court attendance as different 'methods of
retaining control over a defendant's person[,] which was in
custody."""'
The Supreme Court seems to consider the "quasi-custody" status
of an individual an important element in most special needs cases.
For example, the Court held that high school students are under
the "custodial responsibility and authority" of the government and
that this status helped justify suspicionless drug testing."i 2 The
Court also stressed that students have a reduced expectation of
privacy because they are "subjected to greater controls" in the name
of "maintaining discipline, health, and safety."'83 This reasoning
harkens back to Griffin, in which the Court emphasized that
probationers were in "an ongoing supervisory relationship-and one
that is not, or at least not entirely, adversarial."'" It is important to
recall that the officer who conducted the warrantless inspections in
Scott worked for the Department of Alternative Sentencing and was
not a police officer.8 5 The officer's motives were primarily to ensure
that Scott was complying with his release conditions; he was not
conducting a police investigation, even though he was accompanied
179. Most obviously, arrestees' right to freely travel is severely abridged.
180. Scott, 450 F.3d at 886 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (citing Hensley v. Municipal Ct., 411 U.S.
345, 349 (1973)).
181. Id. (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,277-78 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
182. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830-31 (2002).
183. See id.; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (discussing the
reduced privacy interests of student athletes because of their voluntary participation in
student athletics).
184. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987). It is important to acknowledge that
most aspects of the federal and state pretrial systems, like the probation system in Griffin,
are at least in part nonadversarial. See supra Part I.B.
185. See Scott, 450 F.3d at 876 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
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by various police officers.1" Again, the pretrial services mission is
not only to protect the community but also to ensure the fair
administration of justice and to help bring positive change into the
lives of those under suspicion.a"7 Scott's status as a pretrial arrestee
who was in an ongoing quasi-custodial relationship with the
criminal justice system gives credence to the government's claim
that there are "special needs" that justify warrantless searches.
Explicitly acknowledging the quasi-custodial status of pretrial
arrestees would avoid granting pretrial arrestees unfettered rights
that fail to account for the very real dangers that they pose to
society, to themselves, and to the administration of justice.
2. The Ninth Circuit'8 Waffle
The majority in Scott rejected the government's special needs
argument, but in many ways, left open the possibility that a special
needs argument could be recognized in the future if the government
can prove empirically that there is a 'demonstrated problem' of
drug use leading to nonappearance."' The court, in its quest to find
the '"primary' or 'ultimate' purpose[" of the pretrial supervision
program,l" conceded that the government's stated goal of "ensuring
that pretrial releasees appear in court" would qualify as a special
need exception, but that the government did not prove that drug
use by Scott would likely lead to his nonappearance. 19 Requiring
empirical proof that there is a nexus between drug use and nonap-
pearance places an unprecedented burden on the government.
Although the Supreme Court has mentioned in dicta that empirical
evidence "would shore up" a special needs claim, the Court has
stressed that empirical evidence is "not in all cases necessary."1 9 '
For example, in Earls, the Court allowed general concerns about
the "nationwide epidemic of drug use" to help justify special
186. See id.
187. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. The mission of the pretrial system is almost
indistinguishable from the mission of the probation system as described in Griffin; both
systems strive to protect the "public interest" while keeping in mind the "welfare" of the
individual under their supervision. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876.
188. Scott, 450 F.3d at 870 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997)).
189. Id. at 869.
190. Id. at 870-71.
191. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319.
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needs.'92 The Court rejected the argument that the government
must show a "particularized or pervasive drug problem" in order to
institute random drug testing for students participating in extracur-
ricular activities. 9 ' The claim of the majority in Scott that "[hiere,
there is no obvious connection between drug use and appearance
in court sufficient to obviate the need for a showing of factual
nexus" is at odds with its later admission that the United States
Congress had made explicit legislative findings making that very
connection. 94 Other courts have had no problem seeing this same
connection between drug use and nonappearance at trial.'95 The
combination of judicial and congressional findings suggests at the
very least that there is a rational basis for concluding that the
condition was reasonably designed to assure that Scott appeared at
trial. 196
The majority seemed to have sensed that its special needs
analysis was not on the firmest of footing: The 2006 opinion so far
discussed in this Note is in fact an amended version of an older,
brasher opinion, ' which the Ninth Circuit withdrew when it
rejected a request to rehear Scott en banc.'95 This amended opinion
attempted to narrow the court's holding by adding a series of new
footnotes throughout the opinion that severely limited the court's
special needs analysis. 9 9 For example, footnote eight attempted to
narrow the ruling to apply only to Nevada's version of § 3142 by
stating that, "[h]ad defendant been on bail under the federal system,
such a legislative finding, coupled with the fact that Scott was
arrested for a drug-related crime, may have warranted a different
192. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002).
193. Id. at 835.
194. See Scott, 450 F.3d at 871 nn.7-8; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(ix)-(x) (1994). The
court reconciled these statements by stating that it was considering only the Nevada statute,
which, unlike Congress, had not made explicit legislative findings. See Scott, 450 F.3d at 871
n.8.
195. See Scott, 450 F.3d at 895 (Callahan, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed to a First
Circuit opinion for the proposition that "about one-third of the defendants who do not appear
for their pretrial hearings are charged with narcotics violations." Id. at 895-96 (citing United
States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 397-98 (1st Cir. 1985)).
196. See id. at 896 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
197. See United States v. Scott, 424 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2005).
198. See United States v. Scott, No. 04-10090, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 14154 (9th Cir. June
9, 2006).
199. See, e.g., Scott, 450 F.3d at 870-71 nn.7-8.
[Vol. 48:23652394
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONAL RELEASE
outcome.""2 ' The majority also noted that, "[t]he balance usually will
be struck differently in cases where the defendant is required to
report for drug-testing at a location away from his home."' 0' 1 The
majority blatantly retreated from its earlier opinion in footnote
twelve when it conceded:
We do not hold that the government can never justify drug-
testing as a condition of pretrial release. Such a condition may
well be justified based on a legislative finding or an individual-
ized finding that defendant's ability to appear in court will be
impaired absent drug-testing. Any unpublished dispositions of
our court construing Scott as containing a categorical prohibition
on drug-testing bail conditions are not precedential and are, in
any event, superseded by this amended opinion. °2
Even supporters of the majority's opinion must be concerned about
these footnotes because they open the door for future decisions that
are adverse to the rights of pretrial arrestees. As a recent casenote
stated, "[t]he importance of an opinion ... often lies not in the
specific outcome it reaches, but rather in the framework it lays
down for the resolution of future cases."20 3 This piece expressed
concern about the majority's concession that consent is a salient
factor that can weigh in favor of a search's reasonableness.2 4 The
Ninth Circuit essentially laid the groundwork for a subsequent
court to find that ensuring pretrial arrestees' attendance in court
and their "quasi-custodial" status represents a special need that
justifies random drug testing and warrantless searches.
C. Totality of the Circumstances Balancing Test: Knights and
Samson
After rejecting the consent and special needs exceptions, the Scott
majority quickly dismissed the totality of the circumstances test.20 5
The general "totality of the circumstances" balancing test was laid
200. Id. at 871 n.8.
201. Id. at 872 n.10.
202. Id.
203. See Recent Cases, supra note 5, at 1637.
204. See id.
205. See Scott, 450 F.3d at 872.
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out in United States v. Knights and requires "assessing, on the
one hand, the degree to which [the restriction] intrudes upon an
individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."2 °6
In many ways, the facts in Knights were similar to the facts in
Griffin and Scott. Knights was a probationer who consented to
random searches as a condition of his release.20 7 A police detective
conducted a search of Knights's home after he formed reasonable
suspicion that Knights was involved in a recent arson.20 ' The
detective discovered incriminating evidence, including a detonation
cord, ammunition, and liquid chemicals, and Knights was arrested
and charged.20 9 The District Court and the Ninth Circuit both held
that the evidence must be suppressed because the search was
"investigatory" rather than "probationary" and thus there was no
special needs exception to excuse the lack of a warrant or probable
cause.210 The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that regardless
of whether the special needs exception applied, "a lesser degree [of
suspicion] satisfies the Constitution when the balance of govern-
mental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable."21'
In a way, the Court announced a new constitutional test that used
the same underlying analysis found in the special needs cases
but applied it "under a different paradigm" to "'ordinary' criminal
case[s]." '212 As Professor Urbonya noted: "Even though the Knights
Court did not apply Griffin's special needs analysis to the case, it
ironically quoted Griffin (a 'special needs' case) repeatedly to
characterize how it should strike the balance of interests (in this
'ordinary' criminal case)." '2 13 Given the Supreme Court's heavy
206. Id. at 873 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-21 (2001)). Knights
involved a probation order that conditioned release on the probationer's consent to
warrantless searches of his "residence, vehicle, [and] personal effects." Knights, 534 U.S. at
114. The Court upheld the condition because probationers "do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty
to which every citizen is entitled"' and thus the condition is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment so long as there is reasonable suspicion of a violation of the condition. Id. at 119
(quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)).
207. Id. at 114.
208. Id. at 115.
209. Id. at 115-16.
210. Id. at 116.
211. Id. at 121.
212. See Urbonya, supra note 86, at 1425.
213. Id.
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borrowing from special needs jurisprudence for its totality balancing
test, it is not surprising that the majority in Scott determined that
the balancing test tipped in favor of the pretrial arrestees; its earlier
consent and special needs analysis paved the way for this part of the
opinion undermining the Knights test.214 The majority undervalued
the salient nature of Scott's consent and his status as a pretrial
arrestee in weighing Scott's privacy interests. 5 The majority also
gave little credence to the government's legitimate interests in
protecting the public and securing attendance at trial when it relied
on a lack of empirical evidence linking drug arrests with pretrial
misbehavior.216 Once these individual factors are given their proper
weight, the totality of the circumstances balancing test would
almost certainly tip in the government's favor.
After Scott was decided, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Samson v. California, which further defined the contours
of the totality of the circumstances test.217 The Samson Court held
that a "condition of release can so diminish or eliminate a released
prisoner's reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspicionless
search by a law enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth
Amendment.""21 The facts of Samson are almost identical to the
facts in Knights except that the police's search of Samson was not
even based on reasonable suspicion. Samson was stopped by a
police officer who searched Samson's pockets "based solely on [his]
petitioner's status as a parolee" and found methamphetamine.21 s
In rejecting Samson's claim that the search was unreasonable,
the Court, citing its reasoning in Knights, found that Samson's
status as a parolee was "salient" in determining his "expectation of
privacy."22 The Court also found that Samson's consent was salient
because the condition was 'clearly expressed' to petitioner" and he
signed the order making him 'unambiguously' aware of it."22' The
Court made no mention of the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions in its analysis and seemed to treat the bargain as a criminal
214. See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2006).
215. See id. at 873-74.
216. See id. at 874 n.15.
217. See 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2197 (2006).
218. Id. at 2196.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2199 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001)).
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waiver. Finally, the Court credited the government's "overwhelming
interest" in supervising those in the 'legal custody of the California
Department of Corrections., 222 The Court did not demand empirical
evidence linking the parolee's status with the likelihood of nonap-
pearance; rather the Court held that merely "by virtue of his
status," Samson was "more likely than the ordinary citizen to
violate the law."22 All these conclusions severely undercut the Scott
majority's rationale and suggests that the balancing test should
favor the government.
Finally, the Samson Court considered where parolees ought to fit
in the 'continuum' of state-imposed punishments."22 4 Pretrial
arrestees are not meant to be "punished" by the imposition of
conditions on their release and this important requirement clearly
places them outside the Court's continuum of punishment. Yet it is
possible that this apparent inconsistency is not fatal. The reasoning
behind the Samson and Knights opinions did not hinge entirely on
the fact that parolees and probationers were being punished;
punishment was just one of several factors the Court weighed.
Clearly, those entering and those leaving the criminal justice
system share more similarities than differences. Both groups
remain "in the legal custody" of the state and must "comply with all
of the terms and conditions" of release "including mandatory drug
tests, restrictions on association with felons or gang members, and
mandatory meetings with parole officers." '225 Both groups can be
seen as in the "quasi-custody" of the state, thus entitling the state
to require compliance with conditions to ensure public safety.
26
These similarities are striking enough to warrant extending the
"continuum" to cover those entering the criminal justice system, like
pretrial arrestees, as well as those who, like probationers, are
leaving the system. If the continuum were extended so, it would
222. Id. at 2199-20. The Samson majority did examine some "empirical evidence" that
"[riecidivism is a serious public safety concern in California and throughout the Nation" but
this evidence seemed intended simply to "shore up" the legitimacy of the government's
interest and was not dispositive. Id. at 2200 (quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26
(2003)). Even the dissent in Samson acknowledged that "one cannot deny that the (state's]
interest itself is valid." Id. at 2207 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 2197 (majority opinion) (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 120).
224. Id. at 2198.
225. Id. at 2199.
226. See supra Part III.B.1.
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become apparent that pretrial arrestees would have a much
greater expectation of privacy than parolees, but only slightly
greater privacy expectations than those on probation. So, whereas
suspicionless searches, like those in Samson, would clearly be
unreasonable for pretrial arrestees, searches based on reasonable
suspicion, like those in Knights, should be deemed reasonable. In
this way, pretrial arrestees would be treated differently than
ordinary citizens, but still retain more rights than many others on
conditional release.
CONCLUSION
Any time courts balance interests in constitutional law, they must
ensure that they give the proper weight to each factor. The major-
ity's determination in Scott that a pretrial arrestee has the same
privacy rights as an "ordinary citizen" and that the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions applied when waiving one's Fourth
Amendment rights skewed the proper weights and distorted Scott's
expectation of privacy. In doing so, the court deemed unconstitu-
tional a practice designed to ensure the release of the maximum
number of arrestees. Ironically, the decision will undoubtedly create
less robust privacy rights for arrestees because courts will be
more reluctant to release drug offenders without some adequate
assurances that they will not harm society by continued drug-
related crime. Judges will thus increasingly require bail to ensure
compliance. This practice in turn will increase the total number of
arrestees who cannot afford bail and are subjected to pretrial
confinement. In perhaps the greatest irony, the conditions this
decision will foster stand in contrast to those of the 1966 Bail
Reform Act period, in which arrestees were liberally allowed to be
released with no consideration for the dangerousness they posed to
the community. Instead, the Scott decision will mean a return to the
pre-1966 system in which bail and confinement were the norm. This
seemingly progressive decision could potentially have a regressive
effect on criminal procedure, setting it back decades.
Andrew J. Smith
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